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Toward a 
though .. . on that 
it signifieifofhs. It is the 
body which points out, 
and which speaks . . . 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 1 
-<'-
Phenomenology 
Like somatics, phenomenology holds a 
non dualistic philosophy of the body. 
Phenomenology develops the inclusive 
concept of "the lived body": ourselves 
as our bodies, experienced as mind, 
soul, flesh and spirit. Phenomenology 
is the study of experience-sometimes 
called the study of consciousness. It 
studies immediate awareness as lived 
whole-body consciousness. 
Somatics 
Somatics develops educational tech-
niques and therapies based on aware-
ness of our bodies at rest and in 
motion, the same awareness that phe-
nomenology describes. Somatic educa-
tion and therapy affect experiential 
materializations of bodymind integrity. An 
integrity is an unbroken whole; the 
te rm also refers to honesty, which 
points in this case to a bodily lived 
soundness. The term affect is used here 
in a twofold sense: "to influence 
change" and "to move the emotions." 
These meanings are also basic to a 
definition of the aesthetic, a theme I 
develop more fully in Dance and the 
Lived Body.2 O ne of my purposes here 
will be to explore affectivity as a foun-
dational link between somatics and 
aesthetics. 
The Spiral Dance 
My use of "materialization" in the 
paragraph above suggests that the 
body is less objective material and 
more ongoing process than we typical-
ly suppose-as Judith Butler's text, 
Bodies That Matter, explores.3 Butler 
articulates a feminist, phenomenologi-
cal, and post-structuralist view. Despite 
this mouthful, her insight can be stat-
ed quite simply in a phenomenologi-
cal context. We are constantly 
becoming-thus coming to "matter"-
in ways that we ourselves make come 
true. And this "mattering" is actualized 
physically and metaphysically at on ce, 
as a dance of becoming. 
In the above, I am weaving together 
my worlds of phenomenology, its femi-
nist developments, dance, and somat-
ics. It seems I am forever defining 
phenomenology whenever I write or 
speak about it, because it is more than 
a word. It is a worldview, in fact-a rec-
ognized and much-trodden path in 
philosophy that seeks to describe the 
self-evidential core of being, and 
refutes the notion we inherited from 
Aristotle that there is something non-
material called "mind" that moves 
something material called "body." 
Modern science does not bear out 
the dualistic notion that we inherited 
from the father of biology. We gain 
P-henomenology 
of Somatics 
from Aristotle the double-blind myth 
of mind/ male dominance, that the 
mind moves the inferior body (the 
myth of the mind in the machine, as 
phenomenologist Gilbert Ryle has 
studied it in Concept of Mind) ,4 and the 
myth of man as superior to woman. 
Aristotle 's biology teaches that the 
male is the true parent, the female 
merely the bearer of the child. His 
philosophy of human types places man 
in the position of mind and agency. 
Woman is passive; she is body as vessel, 
and fu rther still, an incomplete male, 
distorted.5 
Phenomenology as it is being writ-
ten today rejects this double-blind 
myth, although earlier, especially in 
Jean Paul Sartre, phenomenology per-
petuated male normality and female 
abnormality. Sartre saw woman as both 
docile and dangerous, the "slimy" 
other "in the form of a hole," 6 even as 
he disputed mind/body dichotomy in 
his existential phenomenology which 
grew as a protest philosophy. 
Phenomenology did not identify the 
body as an independent entity, imply-
ing that the mind is somehow other 
and non-physical. 
Through new phenomenology and 
somatic practices, we understand that 
the body is minded, besouled, and 
spirited (the tripartite that classical 
Greek philosophy treated as psyche}. 
On the physical level, the body has a 
brain with its nervous system branch-
ing throughout. Can mind (if we see it 
arising from the brain) operate "with-
in" still a separate category called the 
body? How would one divorce the 
brain-mind from the body? We could 
cut off the head. See how absurd it 
gets? 
As a philosophical method, phe-
nomenology pays particular attention 
to how body/ mind issues are 
described. Dualism is established or 
eradicated through language. 
Phenomenology evolved the concept 
of "the lived body," or more currently, 
"the living body," and it developed 
"corpereity" to describe the body sub-
ject. We are not ever just objects; the 
body is alive with subjectivity from 
head to toe. 
I do not hold with all of phenome-
nological discourse as it developed 
with Merleau-Ponty,Jean Paul Sartre, 
Martin Heidigger, and the first con-
temporary feminist in philosophy, 
Simone de Beauvior. (De Beauvior was 
the first to explain the "anti-essential-
ist" and still-debated thesis that gender 
is constituted through learned and 
culturally established behavior. ) But I 
do find a continuum of thought 
extending from these first existential 
phenomenologists to more recent 
phenomenology. (Butler is also an 
anti-essentialist.) It has held consis-
tently that mind and body are not dif-
ferent entities; they are merely 
different ways we have developed of 
explaining physical and mental bodily 
phenomena. The living body is the 
source of thought and feeling. 
Differentiation comes through our expe-
rience of body and with language. Body 
consciousness can seem either whole 
or fragmented . Our awareness is con-
stituted out of the whole bodymind in 
both cases, even though we can 
describe experiences where the body 
seems absent or even dead in certain 
parts.7 We can describe differences 
between reason and emotion, splits of 
attention, altered states, and indeed 
many other states of the body, even 
feelings of disembodiment. And many 
researches into near-death experi-
ences indicate that consciousness may 
travel beyond ordinary reality in man-
ners similar to the dream state. The 
above examples do not imply that the 
body and the mind are metaphysically 
separate. They point to our ability to 
objectify and describe various levels of 
experience through language. We 
commonly call such experiences spiri-
by Sondra Horton Fraleigh, M.A. 
tual, physical, emotional, and mental 
according to their differing affective 
qualities. We might even think of 
them as produced through our bodily 
lived aesthetic, as feeling tones surface 
to color our moods and movements 
(or otherwise get obstructed) . 
One of the primary insights of phe-
nomenology is that the body is a sub-
ject, not an object. We can objectify 
the body, as we necessarily do in med-
ical research or in learning movement 
(which foot goes forward on step three 
in a dance or awareness of the torso 
over the pelvis in a somatic explo-
ration, for instance). But this does not 
make the body an object. The alive 
body remains always a subject, even 
though we can objectify it in awareness 
and in language. 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception was an explicit refutation of 
body/ mind dualism. Like Sartre's and 
Heidigger's, his philosophy was a criti-
cism of the dualisms initiated by 
Aristotle that were further consolidat-
ed by Descartes. Since Descartes, we 
mistakenly suppose that mind and 
matter are separate, even oppositional, 
as Descartes carries material/ nonma-
terial dualisms further than Aristotle 
in his Meditations.8 The field of somat-
ics is not immune to these problems of 
language and their influence on per-
ception. The body/mind split is 
assumed in somatic literature and 
practices that seek to "integrate the 
body and the mind"-as though they 
were separate to begin with. This is a 
misleading figure of speech. 
"Bodymind integrity" might be a good 
substitute, as an expression of the 
inseparable unity of psyche and soma. 
"Integration" may indeed be accom-
plished in somatic therapy, but it is 
usually descriptive of structural and 
functional improvement that involves 
the bodymind as a root given, with all 
the complexities of body conscious-
ness that ensue from this source. 
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Body/mind dualism is far from the ducing a psychoanalytic of sexuality these soft boundaries need to state 
truth of our experience. Without our tha t conceives of power as penetra- clearly "yes" or "no," in respecting 
bodily existence, there is no source for tion, "the filling of holes." T he pene- one's own body wisdom. I refer to the 
I the evolution of mental phenomena trating penis is commonly called a power to differentiate and discriminate. 
nor "house for the soul" (in the Jan- gun; it has power to shoot, and is 
• guage of dualistic theology). The equated with control and conquest. Natural Powers and the Core Self I 
original phenomenologists saw that Sheets:Johnstone shows that in our 
the body is not an object, not some cultural milieu, "what is not a matter In reflecting a philosophy of na ture • 
"thing" we have as a possession (or a of (phallocentric) control is not a mat- that includes differentiation and 
burden) to transport through life and ter of power." 12 human development, we can turn to ~ relinquish at death, as though our Beneath the cultural trappings of infant life and its powers of differenti-
essential self were other than body. We power, where do our original feelings ated embodiment per se. As Sheets-
don't have bodies (joyfully). We are bodies of empowerment form? Feelings of Johnstone critiques the psychoanalytic , 
(even though in somatic bodywork we power are first awakened as bodily of Jacques Lacan, she sees it as essen- j might describe "finding" our body, as powers (I can open and close my tially disembodied, proceeding from lin-
though it had been lost).9 hands, turn my head , make sounds, guistics, and not somatically founded: I 
New phenomenology, particularly whistle, swim, walk and run). These "a microcosm of twentieth-century I 
its feminist branch , holds that the are mitigated by cultural permissions Western practices" scientizing and f 
body is performative. We "say" our and constraints associated with such silencing the living body. Lacan's 
bodies constantly, incessantly, perfor- powers. (I learned to whistle very "fragmented body" stage of infancy 
• matively. That the body can express shrilly between my tongue and teeth at (and Merleau-Ponty's glossing over 
and does speak its truth (its problems, young age, an "empowering" accom- it) 13 misses the core realities of kines-
secrets, and intrinsic powers) is not plishment that I rarely use since thesia in infant life and human devel- • 
news to dancers and somatics practi- becoming civilized.) Sheets:Johnstone opment. He is unaware of the further I tioners. 10 Somatic explorations are also shows how evolutionary heritage realities that should empower an ethics 
performed as human expressions, with generates corporeal archetypes that of care- not control. The infant expe- • intentional awareness, often in a thera- are culturally "reworked," then indi- riences a confused reality in Lacan's 
peutic mode, and sometimes with an vidually elaborated, entrenching even account; it is not in command because I 
aesthetic intent that is like dance. In more deeply the reigning conceptions it is not in control. "It has no power."14 r 
any case , somatic modalities may be of power. She points toward the T he infant as nondiscriminating and l dancelike, as consciously undertaken immense work of empowering from a inept is not borne out in research ! activities that tap our habitually mate- basis of transformation rather than (unavailable to Lacan and Merleau-rializing "body speech." Ultimately, penetration, the universal but largely Ponty). For more positive views, we they undo performative intentionality unacknowledged coupling/ relational can turn to Mary Douglas's Natural 
in a the rapeutic mode of nondoing, to character of the penis, the transforma- Symbols, 15 to Daniel Stern's work on 
t let the dance happen. tive character of birth, and of infant intelligent infant life, and th e work of That the expressions of the body and human development. Then cognitive psychologist].]. Gibson , who 
exist in a cultural context is a power would no longer be power to showed that basic knowledge of space I 
• concern for phenomenology control. and objects is given in perception 
I and somatics alike. New phenomenal- Might "change" itself, as rooted in itself. 16 When Stern considers "the 
ogy is examining how our cultural the inevitable ongoing cycles of sense of a core self," he states that at + 
milieu influences and even fixes the nature, ever be culturally valued? The two to three months the infant gives 
1 limits of our bodily capabilities. modern field of phenomenology is impressions of being a distinct self, Butler's focus is how bodies come to based on understanding the temporal- and between two and seven months it 
1 matter (to "matte r" is also to "mean"), ity of perception and our intersubjec- completes its differentiation of self which bodies come to matter more tive position in the changing life-world. from other. He challenges the notion 
than others, and how gender power Likewise, the field of somatics is based that the infant lives in a non-differenti-
differentials are culturally and politi- on the "power" of the bodymind to ated state of oneness with the mother. 
cally enforced. Maxine Sheets- change toward health and well be ing T he infant creates an interpersonal 
Jo hnstone critiques the veiled through integrated and functional world. Stern sees that the core self is 
patriarchy of early phenomenology actions that sustain positive intersub- formed on the basis of self-agency, 
extending into psychoanalysis and atti- jective relationships to others and to self-coherence, self-affectivity and self- l tudes toward ( deconstructions of) the nature, the ecological life-world of history, a sense of being a nonfrag-
1 
animate body. In The Roots of Power: which our living body is an extension. men ted, physical whole with 
Animate Form and Gendered Bodies, 11 she The fields of phenomenology and boundaries and integrated action, 
exposes the oppression of women 's somatics provide examples of theoreti- both while moving (behaving) and 
bodies as psychically rooted in our cal and methodological means toward when stillY The affective signals I 
unexamined cultural assumptions and a new definition of power as transfor- somatic "awareness" of feeling. It is l attitudes toward the body and control marion. Both are interpersonally that which is felt or sensed and 
(the mind in control of the body, and founded in letting go of needs to embodied at the somatic level. Many I 
phallic control as power). She cri- judge, to be right, to force solutions, experimental psychologists suppo rt I 
tiques Sartre's ontology and Jacques to have one's own way. Such transfor- Stern's claim that the natural unfold- I Lacan's poststructuralist psychoanaly- mations are effected through listening ment of abilities of infancy have been sis based on Sartrean ontology as pro- and trusting while knowing when underrated.18 Cognitive psychology 
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shows through experimental research 
how perception interweaves the sens-
es. Separating the senses is an analytic, 
not an experiential reality. 
The phenomenology of Sheets-
Johnstone and cognitive psychology 
(as initiated by J.J. Gibson) show that 
kinaesthesia as manifest in movement 
is the very basis for renditions of bodi-
ly life. Where movement and its affect 
are missing in accounts of human 
learning and therapies, there is no 
persuasive accounting for the living 
body. The adult is her/his body histo-
ry. This link we have with ourselves 
through our body memory of somatic 
sensation is implicit in Andrea Olsen's 
elaboration of experiential anatomy, 
Body Stories. 19 Our body holds our his-
tory and our future unfoldment. We 
carry the self that Sterns calls "the core 
self," the self that Gibson calls "the 
ecological self," related to its environ-
ment in our memory from infancy on. 
We are a continuum, especially in our 
changing and transformation, even 
when experiencing the interruptions 
of illness and self-denial. It is after all 
ourselves (the several selves that are 
elicited in various situations and 
forms) that manifest in all of our expe-
riences. Although some phases of life 
may be repressed or rejected, they are 
nevertheless contributing to the whole 
of our experience. While we can feel 
dualistic splits (we even say, "I am not 
myself lately"), metaphysically we are 
on a continuum with the core unfold-
ing of a self in process. 
In speaking and writing about the 
self and our consciousness of self, we 
need maps that will not substitute 
words for experience, but rather find 
the words in the experience. This, of 
course, has been the main task of phe-
nomenology at its descriptive level. 
Phenomenological generation of theo-
ry and analytic is based on intuitive/ 
descriptive study that seeks to uncover 
"the essence" of experience, or the 
phenomena of consciousness, as it is 
sometimes called. I offer the following 
as an initial foraging into the territory 
of soma tics with the tools of a phe-
nomenologist. Some of the topics 
emerge from the above phenomeno-
logical discourse and its inclusion of 
related matters from cognitive psychol-
ogy, psychoanalysis, aesthetics and 
feminist analysis. 
The Spiral Dance in 
Phenomenology and Somatics 
The affective is the aesthetic, the 
"aesthetic" in kinaesthetic. We are 
aware of movement and experience its 
affective qualities from our earliest 
days. We could properly call the expe-
riential in movement its aesthetic 
dynamic. This indicates that some 
quality has arisen to attention and can 
be identified in its perceptual charac-
ter; the movement's color (or tonus, 
or shape, or temporality, etc.) is not 
simply there, it is in consciousness, 
sensed as differentiated, somatically 
present. The aesthetic (affective) 
already carries a somatic threshold. 
The affective is what it is because it is 
persuasive in consciousness. The 
somatic is what it is because it has 
achieved aesthetic dimensions-
become alive to itself in awareness. 
The aesthetic as the affective is that 
which is valorized in consciousness, 
selected somatically beneath the sway 
of thought and language, an embod-
ied quality that "moves" us to think 
about something, to laugh, to dance, 
to feel grief, etc. 
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Stern describes kinaesthesia as 
"a pervasive reality of self-action 
whe ther the action is initiated by self 
or passively initiated by another." 20 
Our capacity to move makes possible 
the very conception of ourselves as 
"animate form." And our experience 
of ourselves in a world of others, how 
we come to know ourselves "somaes-
thetically" further delineates our 
movement. We move away and toward , 
are attracted and repelled , experience 
the other through our movement 
toward and away as conditioned by the 
approach of the other. We experience 
the ultimate magic and miracle of 
touch. Courage, fear, love and hope 
are all born in our experience, or 
somatic life, if you will. They are 
"kinaesthetically" expressed in our 
movement, large and small, even the 
micro-movements that animate a smile 
or a sn eer, and color immediately the 
entire person. 
Recently a student asked me what 
the universals of somatics are. I hesitat-
ed and stammered. I don ' t know if 
there are universals, unless we think of 
them as common links between the 
various somatic movement education 
and therapeutic philosophies, disci-
plines, methods, and techniques. I 
place philosophy first, because the re is 
a philosophy ei ther implicit or actually 
stated in all somatic designs. As I 
began to work out my understandings 
of the somatic strategies I have studied 
(Feldenkrais®, CranioSacral Therapy, 
Myofascial Release, the Alexander 
Technique, yoga, and Holotropic 
Breathwork) , I became aware of how 
they all converged in certain methods 
I had acquired philosophically from 
phenomenology. 
Phenomenology and somatics both 
study awaren ess, allowing "the 
essence" of a phenomenon (anything) 
to arise in consciousness, getting "in 
touch " with it intuitively, allowing it to 
express itself as it is. "Back to the 
things themselves" was Edmund 
Husserl's declaration as he articulated 
the foundation of phenomenology. 
Somatics, like phenomenology, gives 
up the need to judge and interpret, lis-
tening to "prereflective" conscious-
ness, no t anticipa ting, not assuming 
anything. They both partake of the 
code of the samurai, "Expect noth ing, 
be ready for anything." 
Phenomenology and somatics 
begin in concern for the "life world ," 
not accepting theories in advance, 
reducing superfluous noise so that the 
18 Somatics 1998 
elusive essence of the phenomenon of 
attention may become clear. Consider 
this in the concern of Moshe 
Feldenkrais for "the elusive obvious." 
Phenomenologists know it is not easy 
to describe what is sensed, to say what 
is d irectly in consciousness, and to 
"reduce" this to its essence, its very 
core. Moreover, they acknowledge the 
subjectivity of their descriptions, even 
as they strive to draw forward "the 
object" of attention, the thing itself. 
P erception is layered over with interpretation; we Jearn to dis-trust the directness of our intu-
ition. Yet this is exactly what both 
phenomenology and somatics aim for, 
but with different means. 
Phenomenology is at root verbal and 
descriptive. Somatics is nonverbal; its 
means are movement and touch. The 
methods in both unite and integrate, 
however. Scattered attention and 
in complete body image become whole 
when the performative self is quie ted 
and soma comes into its nature. Then 
the core self manifests. The being we 
call "being" shines. We become fully 
present, even to the past. Words also 
flow from such presence, and can 
become part of somatic processes. 
Phenomenology also works from an 
intuitive base, understanding that we 
can only name from the van tage point 
of our experience. I t begins in silence, 
wiping away predispositions, then spi-
rals inward to name what has already been 
waiting there. Similarly, somatic move-
ment education and therapeutic body-
work hope to elicit (or go back to) the 
natural intelligence of the body, its 
(momentarily hidden ) self-healing 
and self-regulating core. 
The manner of phenomenology is 
open. It aims to describe the "life 
world" as it appears immediately to 
consciousness, without resorting to 
interpretation or analysis. It asks sim-
ply, "What is this?" There is a similar 
attitude in soma tics work that deals 
with awareness. It also begins with a 
question: "What am I feeling right 
now?" And this is not an intellectual 
question. Indeed, this question aims 
to go to the source of causality, before 
the cause was causing anything. T here 
is an innocence at this level of prob-
ing: the innocence of the inquiring 
body, not figuring, not forming, not 
yet firmly in mind yet somatically 
awake and kinaesthetically acknowl-
edged. 
One of the tenets of phenomenolo-
gy (and quantum physics) is that we 
cannot separate ourselves from our 
observations. Perception is an activity, 
not a passivity. The observed {the 
object) and the observer {the subject) 
become one (and interact) in the 
moment of observation. How much 
more do we interac t then when we 
touch others or move with them in 
somatic process? In each case the re is 
a unique (phenomenological) interac-
tion and integration of whole systems, 
or selves, in which both are affected. 
Phenomenology calls this "intersubjec-
tivity" and "intercorpereity." 21 T his 
relation is most apparent in somatic 
processes, and can be described in the 
personalized style of phenomenologi-
cal description: When we touch with 
healing in our hands, we give our 
hands to nature, listen to the nature of 
another, tune our nature to that 
nature, become part of that nature. 
Expect nothing. Wait. Spiral inward. 
When pain moves a dance between us, 
we trace its nascent sorrows, let them 
be silently spoken. We mark the 
changes that occur, converse with the 
body's wisdom and frustrations, some-
times its joy and peace. Not being 
willed, the dance is healing. In the Zen 
of nondoing, it finds its own way. ~ 
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Hampshire, March 1995. 
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